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America is deeply divided along ideological lines. This is hardly a new
phenomenon; throughout our history, our country has been split by issues
on which no compromise is possible. For the first third of American history,
the divisive issue was slavery. Later, the nation divided over
Reconstruction, labor unions, the New Deal, the perceived communist
threat, and civil rights. Today, topics such as abortion, affirmative action,
and the death penalty split left and right, with deeply held beliefs existing
on both sides.
It is hardly surprising that the issues that divide the nation also split the
Supreme Court. Liberal Justices, like liberals in contemporary American
society, are likely to be pro-choice, supportive of affirmative action, and
against the death penalty. Conservative Justices, like conservatives
throughout the country, generally have the opposite views. Indeed, whether
people are "liberal" or "conservative" is largely a function of their views
on these issues.
In his new book, Closed Chambers, Edward Lazarus expresses great
dismay that, for the last decade, the Supreme Court has been politically
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divided, particularly over the issues just mentioned.' Lazarus worries that
this division has infected the Court in a manner that threatens its long-term
legitimacy, and he argues that the ideological politicization of the Court has
made it intellectually dishonest in its processes and opinions.
My initial reaction to Lazarus's book was to applaud its wonderful
prose and its wealth of new information, but to question its underlying
assumption that the Supreme Court should be or can be apolitical. I saw
little evidence in the book that the Court's processes had been
compromised. I thought that Lazarus's impressive work would be the
occasion for a reexamination of the appropriate judicial role in dealing with
the issues that divide the nation and for asking whether Lazarus's premises,
which are derived from the legal process school, are appropriate for
evaluating the Court as it enters the twenty-first century. My primary
concern was that the book's wide audience of nonlawyers might uncritically
accept the author's assumptions about the possibility and desirability of an
apolitical Court.
Unfortunately, this aspect of Lazarus's book seems to have been
completely overlooked.2 Instead, the focus has been on the propriety of
Lazarus writing the book at all. The debate has been over whether it was
appropriate for a former Supreme Court clerk to write about the Court and
particularly about the Term during which he clerked? In a review published
in this Journal, United States Court of Appeals Judge Alex Kozinski
sharply attacks Lazarus for taking this course.' Using virtually every
negative thing said about the book in every critical review yet published,
Kozinski claims that Lazarus acted unethically and immorally.
Kozinski's accusations are completely unfounded. There is little
indication that Lazarus used confidential information that he gained as a
result of being a clerk. Much of the new information in the book comes
from papers that Justice Thurgood Marshall made publicly available, and
much of the rest comes from interviews that Lazarus conducted over
several years of working on the book. In Part I of this Review, I argue that
1. EDWARD P. LAzARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE
EPIc STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1998).
2. I have read numerous reviews of the book and have never seen this concern discussed. See,
e.g., Jeff Bleich et al., Closed Chambers: Has the Integrity of the Supreme Court Been Breached?,
58 OR. ST. B. BULL. 15 (1998) (book review); Michael G. Radigan, Closed Chambers, 219 N.Y.
L.J. 2 (1998) (book review); Special Issue on Edward Lazarus, Closed Chambers, 1 JURIST 2
(May 1998) <http://jurist.law.pitt.edullawbooks/revmay98.htm> (including book reviews by Peter
Irons, David Kairys, Tony Mauro, David O'Brien, Richard Painter, and Mark Tushnet); Kathleen
M. Sullivan, Behind the Crimson Curtain, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 18, 1998, at x.
3. See sources cited supra note 2.
4. See Alex Kozinski, Conduct Unbecoming, 108 YALE L.J. 835 (1999). Kozinski has
publicly declared that he has "nothing but contempt" for Lazarus and that Lazarus is no longer
welcome to appear as an attorney before him. See Tony Mauro, Supreme Court Tightens Secrecy




Lazarus did nothing wrong and that the criticisms of Kozinski and others
are misguided.
Unfortunately, those who object to Lazarus writing the book also find it
necessary to declare that there is nothing new within it that is worth
knowing. Kozinski, for example, writes: "In a book that lays claim to
brilliance and scholarship, Lazarus comes up with not a single new insight
about the Supreme Court or the areas of law he discusses."' There is
something contradictory about lambasting an author for revealing secrets
and then saying that there really were no secrets after all. And here, too, I
think that Kozinski is simply wrong. Lazarus's book makes an extremely
important contribution to our understanding of the Supreme Court,
particularly the Rehnquist Court of the last decade. In part, the contribution
comes from opening the Court to public scrutiny. In part, it comes from the
wealth of new information that the book presents. Part II of this Review
describes these substantial new contributions.
Lazarus does not attempt to be a neutral reporter. Rather, he has a
normative agenda: He is deeply dismayed by the political division on the
current Court and criticizes this split throughout the book. For example, he
writes in the introductory chapter that the "severity of these divisions has
corroded the Court's institutional culture and driven the Justices to
disregard the principles of decision making-deliberation, integrity of
argument, self-restraint-that separate the judicial function from the
exercise of purely political power." 7 Indeed, the book is filled with such
normative judgments, which Lazarus often expresses in passing, such as
when he says that the majority's approach in Furman v. Georgia,8 which
temporarily ended the death penalty, "betrayed the very rule of law they
claimed to be upholding." 9
It is here that I disagree with Lazarus. I believe the Court is, and always
has been, a political institution in that it decides issues that are intensely and
inherently politically divisive. Lazarus's oft-proclaimed desire for a
separation of law and politics is one that I do not understand or share. In
Part I, I criticize Lazarus for not defending his normative vision and
5. Kozinski, supra note 4, at 873.
6. In defense of Kozinski, he in fact says that Lazarus does reveal secrets, but none worth
knowing. See id. at 877 (referring to Lazarus's book as being filled with "hurtful and irrelevant
claptrap" and saying that the book demonstrates that former clerks "are not in a good position to
give us useful information about the institution they serve"). I disagree with Kozinski here on two
levels. First, I am concerned by the notion that a single person could judge whether certain
knowledge is worthless for society. Also, I believe that the information in Lazarus's book is in
fact extremely important. For example, how the Court handles death cases-and whether it serves
as a meaningful check against lawless executions-is enormously important. I address these
points in Part I.
7. LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 7; see also id. at 248 (speaking of the "thin but crucial divide
between law and politics").
8. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
9. LAZARUS, supra note I, at 109.
1999] 1089
The Yale Law Journal
instead presenting it as if it were self-evident. Moreover, I disagree with his
view of the possibility and desirability of an apolitical Court. A Court with
a Justice Brennan and a Justice Scalia will necessarily be ideologically
divided. As explained in Part Im, I believe that Lazarus fails to establish his
claim that the Court's ideological divisions have caused it to act improperly
or in an intellectually dishonest manner.
Lazarus speaks of the Court as if it were a fragile institution with shaky
legitimacy. To the contrary, two centuries of judicial review have made the
Court one of the most highly respected institutions in American society.
There is no indication that its internal divisions have harmed its public
image. In fact, as I will argue, the descriptions in Lazarus's book also could
support a very different set of conclusions. Lazarus depicts a Court immune
from lobbying or improper influence: a group of men and women deeply
engaged in the cases before them and struggling to do the best they can.
I. DID EDWARD LAZARUS Do ANYTHING WRONG?
Imagine a law clerk who, soon after working for a Justice, goes public
with information he learned during his clerkship. The former clerk writes a
book in which he recounts conversations held within chambers and other
forms of inside information. The sole source for this information is the
author's firsthand experience during the clerkship. How should we regard
such a clerk? It is an interesting question, but it is not a question that arises
from Edward Lazarus's book.
The most serious charge against Lazarus would be that he revealed
confidential communications with Justice Harry Blackmun, for whom he
clerked during October Term 1988. The relationship between a Justice and
his or her clerk demands the greatest trust, and it is here that confidential
communications are most likely to occur.'" In the entire book, however,
Lazarus recounts only four conversations with his Justice. One is the
description of his interview with Justice Blackmun for the clerkship." The
depiction is of a warm conversation, and it reveals no Court secrets.
Second, Lazarus describes how at their first breakfast together at the Court,
Justice Blackmun said to Lazarus, "The pancakes aren't so good on
Mondays .... The griddle goes stale over the weekend." 2 Third, after
Justice Blackmun returned to the chambers following the conference in the
Webster case, 3 Lazarus describes the following exchange: "In any event, I
10. This is not to deny that there may be other confidential communications within the Court
to which a law clerk can be privy. I discuss Kozinski's charge that Lazarus breached his duty to
the Court infra text accompanying notes 43-52.
11. See LAzARus, supra note 1, at 23.
12. Id. at 38.
13. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
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stayed in my office and waited for Blackmun to come through my door on
the way to his own. I caught his eye as he slipped quietly by, and he gave a
little shake of his head, then whispered, 'We'll see."'"14
The fourth conversation is the only substantive exchange that Lazarus
reveals. It is a telephone conversation in which Justice Blackmun requested
Lazarus's advice as to whether he should vote to stay a district court
judge's contempt order in the Yonkers housing desegregation case.15
Lazarus discloses that he advised such a vote and that Justice Blackmun
followed that recommendation.'
6
Perhaps Lazarus can be criticized for revealing that one conversation. 7
If it is true that communications between a Justice and a clerk are forever
privileged-something I dispute below-Lazarus should not have disclosed
the exchange. But this one, relatively innocuous conversation hardly seems
to justify the vitriol that Kozinski and others have heaped upon him. 8
Admittedly, Lazarus's publisher did him no favors in the presentation
and marketing of the book. Its subtitle is: "The First Eyewitness Account of
the Epic Struggles Inside the Supreme Court." 9 Its cover boldly identifies
Lazarus as: "Former Supreme Court Clerk." 20 The inside of the book jacket
proclaims:
Never before has one of these clerks stepped forward to reveal how
the Court really works-and why it often fails the country and the
cause of justice. In this groundbreaking book, award-winning
historian Edward Lazarus, a former clerk to Justice Harry A.
Blackmun, guides the reader through the Court's inner sanctum,
explaining as only an eyewitness can the collisions of law, politics
and personality as the Justices wrestle with the most fiercely
disputed issues of our time.2'
It is no wonder that this promotion triggered criticism of Lazarus for
revealing Court secrets learned during his clerkship. The cover promises no
14. LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 401.
15. See Spallone v. United States, 487 U.S. 1251 (1988).
16. See LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 45-46.
17. Kozinski indicates that such criticism is only possible because Lazarus allegedly did not
obtain Justice Blackmun's consent prior to writing the book. See Kozinski, supra note 4, at 839.
But contrary to Kozinski's accusations, we have no idea whether Lazarus obtained such consent.
Justice Blackmun has made no public statement about the book; Kozinski simply repeats a
quotation that "some people close to" Justice Blackmun say that he did not know that Lazarus
was writing the book. I. Justice Blackmun has said nothing, and his silence cannot be interpreted
as either criticism or approval of Lazarus's text.
18. See, e.g., Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Letter to the Editor, TimE, Apr. 20, 1998, at 7; Richard W.
Painter, Editorial, A Law Clerk Betrays the Supreme Court, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 1998, at A23;
Gretchen Craft Rubin, Editorial, Betraying a Trust, WASH. PosT, June 17, 1998, at A27.
19. LAZARUS, supra note I, at front cover.
20. Id.
21. LAZARUS, supra note I, at book jacket.
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less. But we all learned long ago not to judge a book by its cover, and
Lazarus's book must be appraised on the basis of what he wrote-not the
publisher's hype.
Much of Lazarus's book concerns Supreme Court cases decided before
and after the Term that he clerked for Justice Blackmun. Lazarus's material
about his own Term comes from sources external to his clerkship. He
explains that his book is based primarily on a close reading of the publicly
available papers of former Justice Thurgood Marshall and on interviews he
conducted with many sources, including other former clerks2' Lazarus is
clear about this from the outset. In his Author's Note, he writes:
I have been careful to avoid disclosing information I am privy to
solely because I was privileged to work for Justice Blackmun. In
other words, I have reconstructed what I knew and supplemented
that knowledge through primary sources (either publicly available
or provided by others) and dozens of interviews conducted over the
last five years. Indeed, some of the more controversial revelations
in the book, including events that occurred during my clerkship
year, are things of which I was unaware-or dimly aware-at the
time.23
But this does not satisfy Kozinski or Lazarus's other critics. They
maintain that his writing about the Term during which he was at the Court,
even if based upon other sources, was unethical in that it violated a duty of
confidentiality;24 may have been illegal in that it may have violated federal
laws prohibiting the removal of documents from the Court;' and was
immoral in that it involved a breach of trust and loyalty.26 These are serious
accusations, and each requires separate examination.
A. Did Edward Lazarus Act Unethically?
The claim that Lazarus acted unethically rests on two propositions: (1)
that clerks have an ethical duty never to reveal what they learned during
their clerkship; and (2) that Lazarus disclosed secrets in violation of this
duty. The former claim is questionable, and the latter is unsubstantiated.
22. See id. at xi.
23. Il One might respond by arguing that it is impossible to evaluate Lazarus's claim
regarding his sources, because he does not specifically reveal them. I discuss this below. See infra
text accompanying notes 45-46.
24. See Kozinski, supra note 4, at 83846.
25. See id. at 844.
26. See id. at 846-49, 875.
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1. What Is the Ethical Duty of a Former Clerk?
No consensus exists as to what former Supreme Court clerks can and
cannot say. Lazarus is not the first former Supreme Court clerk to write
about the Court or even about his Term at the Court." There is simply no
clearly established rule that governs what former clerks may or may not
disclose about their experience.
Kozinski contends that clerks have a permanent duty of confidentiality.
He points to two primary sources for this putative duty: (1) the Code of
Conduct for Law Clerks of the Supreme Court;28 and (2) an analogy to the
attorney-client privilege. As for the former, it is at best unclear whether the
Code applies to Lazarus, since it was promulgated while he was already
working for Justice Blackmun.29 Even more importantly, the last paragraph
of the Code makes it quite clear that it applies to law clerks only during
their tenure at the Court:
A person to whom this Code becomes applicable shall comply with
it immediately upon commencement of his or her clerkship and
throughout such clerkship. Violations of the Code by a law clerk
may be disciplined by his or her appointing Justice, including
dismissal."
The Code could not be clearer: it applies "throughout [the] clerkship."
It could have said, but does not, that the confidentiality provisions apply
forever. Kozinski makes two responses to this. First, he argues that earlier
paragraphs explicitly state that the confidentiality duty is an ongoing one
and that the explicit trumps the implied.3 There are many problems with
this argument. A close reading of the paragraphs that Kozinski invokes
27. See, e.g., DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WIUTE: A
PORTRAIT OF JUSTICE BYRON R. WHrrE (1998); J. HARVIE WILKINSON, IlI, SERVING JUSTICE: A
SUPREME COURT CLERK'S VIEW (1974). Professor David Garrow has documented that law clerks
frequently have revealed confidential information learned at the Court in a wide variety of
contexts. After extensively reviewing dozens of such instances, Garrow concludes: "The
historical record of the past six decades demonstrates that a host of professionally respected and
academically celebrated former clerks have recounted, by name and 'on the record,' stories of (1)
case-specific intra-Court incidents, (2) private remarks of one Justice about another, and (3) their
influence in the drafting and construction of important, well-known opinions." David J. Garrow,
"The Lowest Form of Animal Life"?: Supreme Court Clerks and Supreme Court History, 84
CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 1999). In fact, Professor Garrow concludes that Dennis
Hutchinson's biography of Justice White reveals far more confidential information than Lazarus's
book. See id.
28. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW CLERKS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
(1989) [hereinafter SUPREME COURT CODE OF CONDUCT]; Kozinski, supra note 4, at 843-45.
29. SUPREME COURT CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 28. As Kozinski notes on the first page
of his review, the Code was promulgated during the 1988 Term, the one in which Lazarus clerked.
Kozinski, supra note 4, at 835; see also id. at 875 (noting that the Code was adopted in 1989).
30. See Supreme COURT CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 28.
31. See Kozinski, supra note 4, at 845.
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shows that they are primarily about the clerk's duty to the Justice during the
clerkship. For example, Kozinski quotes from Canon 2 of the Code of
Conduct, which declares: "The law clerk owes the Justice and the Court
complete confidentiality, accuracy and loyalty. The Justice relies upon the
law clerk's research in reaching conclusions on pending cases." 32 The Code
also provides:
The relationship between Justice and law clerk is essentially a
confidential one. A law clerk should abstain from public comment
about a pending or impending proceeding in the Court. A law clerk
should never disclose to any person any confidential information
received in the course of the law clerk's duties, nor should the law
clerk employ such information for personal gain."
These provisions are written in the present tense and the focus of these
paragraphs is very much on the clerk's duty during the Term; nothing in
them specifically states, as Kozinski asserts, a duty that lasts beyond the
clerkship. Indeed, Kozinski overlooks the significance of the sole
enforcement mechanism in the clerks' Code of Conduct: "Violations of the
Code by a law clerk may be disciplined by his or her appointing Justice,
including dismissal." ' The Justice only has disciplinary authority during
the clerkship. If the Code really intended to regulate conduct beyond the
clerkship it likely would have provided other disciplinary mechanisms, such
as referral for bar discipline or sanctions imposed by the Supreme Court,
including denial of authority to practice there.
Leaving all discipline to the clerk's employing Justice strongly
indicates that the Code was meant to apply only during the clerkship. There
is a basic difference for law clerks between revealing confidences about
pending cases and discussing decisions after they have been made public.
Advance word about what the Supreme Court is going to decide could have
enormous economic value. Decisions on the validity of mergers or the
legitimacy of economic regulations, for instance, can have momentous
consequences, and leaks from the Court while such cases are pending can
create large, unfair market advantages. In contrast, the harms of disclosure
after such decisions come down are far more speculative, and perhaps
nonexistent. It is quite possible that the drafters of the Code of Conduct had
this particular understanding in mind and thus did not contemplate a
scenario like that occasioned by Lazarus.
This is not to say that former clerks should feel free to reveal any and
all information learned during their clerkships. Indeed, Lazarus felt a need
32. Id. at 843; SUPREME COURT CODE OF CONDucT, supra note 28, at Canon 2.
33. SUPREME COURT CODE OF CoNDucT, supra note 28, at Canon 3(C).
34. Id.
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to keep his substantive conversations with Justice Blackmun confidential.
The point is a much more limited one: Whatever ethical duty exists for
former clerks must derive from a source other than the Code of Conduct,
which is written in terms of a current clerk's duty of secrecy.
Kozinski offers a second justification for the clerk' s duty of secrecy: an
analogy to the attorney-client relationship. Indeed, in many places
throughout his review, the crucial, and sometimes the only, support for
Kozinski's criticisms is the application of the attorney-client privilege and
cases interpreting it. This analogy is flawed for many reasons.
First, the Code of Conduct expressly describes a clerk's relationship to
a Justice as a "lawyer-lawyer" relationship, not an attorney-client
relationship.35 Nothing in the Code justifies thinking of conversations
between a Justice and his or her clerk as protected by an attorney-client
privilege. Kozinski invokes the attorney-client privilege to support his
claims of confidentiality, but offers no reason to believe that the clerk-
Justice relationship involves the same principles. There is great rhetorical
force in cloaking the clerk-Justice relationship in the secrecy of the
attorney-client relationship, but neither the law nor the arguments in
Kozinski's review support this approach.
Second, the clarity of the duty attorneys owe clients is vastly different
from the uncertainty about the former clerk's precise obligations. The very
silence of the Code of Conduct about future secrecy makes it different from
the attorney-client privilege, which the law clearly establishes as permanent
and inviolate. Kozinski's analogy to the attorney-client privilege undercuts
his own argument about a former clerk's ethical obligations. The rules of
professional conduct and the case law are clear that an attorney must
forever protect client confidences.36 No such provision exists for law clerks.
Third, in invoking the attorney-client privilege, Kozinski begs a critical
question: To whom is the duty owed? The attorney owes the client a duty of
confidentiality, and it is the client alone who can complain of a breach.37
The Code of Conduct makes it clear that the clerk's primary duty is owed to
the Justice for whom he or she is clerking. It is the Justice, and the Justice
alone, who has authority under the Code to enforce it. If the clerk-Justice
35. lad at Canon 2.
36. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. § 6068(e) (West 1990) ("It is the duty of the
attorney... [tio maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to
preserve the secrets, of his or her client."); Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081,
2084-85 (1998) (holding that the attorney-client privilege survives death); In re Lilly, 2 Cal. St. B.
Ct. Rptr. 473, 478 (1993) (holding that the attorney-client privilege is permanent).
37. Cf. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics (1986) 253-54 (noting that while
clients and lawyers can invoke the privilege, only clients can waive the privilege).
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privilege is like the attorney-client privilege, only Justice Blackmun can
invoke the privilege and complain of disclosures. He has not done so?S
Apart from the Clerk's Code of Conduct or the analogy to the attorney-
client privilege, a normative argument could be made that former clerks
have an ongoing ethical duty of secrecy as to what they learned during their
clerkship. I do not deny that some such duty exists, but defining its scope is
enormously difficult. Former Supreme Court clerks are often hired as
appellate counsel because of inside information they gained during their
clerkships about what arguments particular Justices might find persuasive.
As previously mentioned, law professors often draw on what they learned
during their clerkships for articles.39 More importantly, information learned
during a clerkship may have differing degrees of sensitivity; not all of this
information need be forever protected as confidential.
Kozinski also argues that the duty of confidentiality is demonstrated by
the fact that many former Supreme Court clerks have criticized Lazarus, but
none have defended him.' This, however, proves nothing. There is no
doubt that the Justices dislike Lazarus's book. I personally have heard one
Supreme Court Justice speak very negatively about it and have heard stories
from others who have spoken to members of the Court. This is hardly
surprising given the book's unflattering portrayals. Former clerks surely do
not want to alienate the Justices for whom they served. Thus, they are likely
to see nothing to gain by speaking out in favor of Lazarus's effort and much
to lose by doing so. The reality is that only a handful of clerks, compared to
the one thousand to whom Kozinski refers,41 have said anything about the
book.
Defining the ethical duty of a former clerk is a hard task and one that
requires a careful and nuanced analysis. Instead of providing one, Kozinski
attempts to invoke an all-inclusive, permanent duty encompassing all
information learned at the Court. This is unjustified; the grounds for
confidentiality that Kozinski provides do not warrant permanent secrecy of
all acquired information. Perhaps Lazarus's book will provide the occasion
for defining the proper scope of a former clerk's duty of confidentiality.
42
But since this duty has not yet been delineated, Lazarus cannot be accused
of breaching it. Even more importantly, as discussed below, Lazarus's
38. See supra note 17. Perhaps Kozinski could argue that the entire Court, and not merely
Justice Blackmun, was Lazarus's client. But again, this claim is belied by the Code of Conduct,
which makes the individual Justice the sole enforcement mechanism and emphasizes the clerk's
duty to that Justice. See SUPREME COURT CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 28. Moreover, it is the
individual Justice who hires a clerk, directs the clerk, and can fire a clerk. If a clerk for a Justice
breaches confidentiality, no other Justice-not even the Chief Justice on behalf of the Court-can
fire him or her.
39. See supra text accompanying note 27.
40. See Kozinski, supra note 4, at 837-38.
41. See id. at 837.
42. See Mauro, supra note 4, at Al.
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reliance on external sources makes it unnecessary to determine the proper
scope of a former clerk's ethical obligations.
2. Did Lazarus Breach a Duty of Confidentiality?
Even if we assume that the Code of Conduct does impose a duty of
permanent confidentiality on Lazarus, did he breach it?"3 Kozinski relies
heavily on the language of Canon 2 of the Code, which states: "A law clerk
should never disclose to any person any confidential information received
in the course of the law clerk's duties, nor should the law clerk employ such
information for personal gain."'  The key words in evaluating Lazarus's
book are "received in the course of the law clerk's duties." Lazarus relies
on information gained from sources beyond his own experience working for
Justice Blackmun, particularly the Marshall papers and interviews with
other clerks. Hence, there is no violation of this rule, even assuming that it
applies.
Judge Kozinski makes three arguments as to why Lazarus acted
unethically. First, he says that Lazarus does not disclose his sources, and
therefore there is no way to verify his claim that he gained the information
from sources external to his clerkship4 Once again, Kozinski begs the
question of to whom Lazarus owes this duty. Using Kozinski's analogy to
the attorney-client privilege, the duty is owed only to the Justice for whom
Lazarus clerked, or at most, to the Supreme Court. Therefore, Lazarus has
no duty to Kozinski, to me, or to the general public to prove that he did not
rely on confidential information.
Kozinski is correct that readers must rely on Lazarus's word for his
claim that he did not utilize confidential information learned solely during
his clerkship. It is Kozinski, however, who makes the serious charge of
unethical conduct, and he cannot prove his case by trying to shift the burden
to Lazarus. The benefit of confidential sources, such as those used by
Lazarus, is that they provide information that would not be available if
attribution were given; the disadvantage is that when the source of
43. It is possible to argue that even if the Code of Conduct does not apply to law clerks there
is still an ethical duty based upon a common understanding that clerks should not reveal
information learned at the Court. At the very least, the accusation of violating this "common
understanding" is much less serious than the claim of violating a written code of ethics. In a
profession governed by a written code, a claim of violating a code provision carries much more
rhetorical and actual force than the charge of violating an unwritten norm. The former implies
clearly unethical behavior in a way that the latter does not. The problem with Kozinski's claim
based on common understandings is that there can be legitimate disagreement about what was
understood. Moreover, the contours of this common understanding are uncertain. Other former
clerks have written books about the Court, including information about their Terms. See sources
cited supra note 27.
44. SUPREME COURT CODE OF CONDUCT. supra note 28, at Canon 3(C).
45. See Kozinski, supra note 4, at 838-40.
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information is unknown, its veracity is difficult to evaluate.46 Lazarus's
claims, based on confidential, unidentified sources, can be doubted and, like
all such accounts, should be treated with some skepticism, but that does not
prove that Lazarus acted unethically.
Second, Kozinski argues that Lazarus acted unethically because he
encouraged other clerks to breach their own confidentiality duties. Kozinski
states: "[I]t seems absurd to argue that a former clerk honors his own duty
of confidentiality by inducing other clerks to betray theirs."'47 Kozinski
argues that the former clerks were more willing to speak to Lazarus because
he worked with them. Kozinski declares:
Would former clerks have been willing to discuss events at the
Court during their mutual time there? Certainly, as there is no wall
of confidentiality between law clerks of the same
vintage .... Clerks ... would have assumed he was familiar with
the events himself and was talking to them to refresh his
recollection or gain a new perspective."
Kozinski's argument assumes that former clerks have a duty not to
discuss their work even after their clerkships have been over for several
years. Again, even assuming this, Kozinski creates a duty nowhere
contained in the Code: A former law clerk's duty not to encourage other
clerks to reveal information learned during their clerkships. The ethical
charge against Lazarus is based on the Code of Conduct, but this Code
contains no rule prohibiting anyone, including former clerks, from speaking
with clerks or former clerks.
I would expect that Lazarus informed his former co-clerks that he was
writing a book about the Court before he spoke with them. There is no
evidence that he failed in this duty of disclosure or otherwise acted
unethically in speaking with former clerks. Kozinski again tries to deal with
this by shifting the burden to Lazarus. Kozinski implies that Lazarus has the
burden of establishing that he did not take advantage of his position as a
former law clerk. 9 Once more, Lazarus has no duty to Kozinski, or anyone
other than Justice Blackmun, to prove anything. Also, Kozinski unfairly
places a burden on Lazarus that cannot possibly be met; Lazarus seemingly
could satisfy Kozinski only by presenting sworn affidavits from every
confidential source indicating precisely what Lazarus said prior to the
interview. Such disclosure would force Lazarus into betraying his promise
of confidentiality to these sources.
46. Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (discussing First Amendment protection for
reporters' confidential sources).
47. Kozinski, supra note 4, at 840.




Kozinski's also relies upon the argument that Lazarus deceived the
former clerks into speaking with him. He writes: "Lazarus does not claim
that he alerted fellow clerks that they should treat him as if he were an
ordinary journalist. Without such a warning, he cannot claim that the
disclosures made to him by fellow clerks were independent of his own
status as a former clerk."50 It is quite understandable, however, that Lazarus
does not describe in detail the conversations he had with fellow clerks
before their interviews. When he wrote the book, no one had questioned the
methods of these interviews, and thus it was not to be expected that he
would need to address Kozinski's later criticisms.
In sum, Kozinski has no way to know what Lazarus said, or did not say,
to those he interviewed. Kozinski simply assumes the worst-that Lazarus
deceived his fellow former clerks-and then criticizes him on this basis.
Yet Kozinski, for all of his efforts to criticize Lazarus, could not find one
clerk to say that he or she was duped into talking with Lazarus. Perhaps that
is because the clerks who were his sources do not want their identities to be
known, or perhaps it is because they knew exactly what Lazarus was doing
and saw no problem with helping him. The point is that Kozinski expressly
criticizes Lazarus for deceiving his fellow clerks, yet there is no evidence
whatsoever to support that serious charge.
Finally, Kozinski argues that Lazarus acted improperly because he
benefited from knowledge gained as a clerk. Kozinski maintains that even if
information gained as a clerk was substantiated from other sources, his
behavior was still inappropriate. Kozinski writes:
The flaws in Lazarus's reconstruction theory are highlighted by
comparing him to a lawyer who writes a book disclosing client
confidences. Like Lazarus, the lawyer claims he breached no
ethical duty because he assumed the role of journalist and then had
a long conversation with his co-counsel, during the course of which
the other lawyer revealed every piece of confidential information
that found its way into the book. Would we accept this as an
adequate excuse for the disclosure?"'
Kozinski cites to a case involving the attorney-client privilege as support
for this point.5"
Once more, Kozinski improperly assumes that the attorney-client
privilege and the clerk-Justice privilege are identical. In addition to the
reasons discussed above as to why they are not analogous, it is crucial to
recognize the extreme nature of the bar that Kozinski's theory would
50. Id.
51. Id. at 842 (citations omitted).
52. See id. at 842 n.39.
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impose on former Supreme Court clerks. No former clerk could ever
discuss-in a classroom, in an article, in a book, or anywhere else-any
case without proving that everything uttered was based on publicly
available information. According to Kozinski, because clerks undoubtedly
learn things about earlier Term cases during their tenure, they also cannot
discuss these cases without meeting the standard of proof that he imposes.
This reasoning helps explain why the attorney-client relationship is not
analogous to the clerk-Justice relationship. An attorney is forever limited to
discussing only publicly available information about a case. In contrast,
Kozinski's burden, taken seriously, would preclude clerks from talking
about any case decided by the Court during the Term in which they clerked
or any previous Term. This burden cannot be right, as it is both unrealistic
and unfair. Clerks will inevitably discuss cases from their Terms in classes
they teach, briefs they write, and articles they author. Rather, so long as the
clerk relies on other sources of information, there is no breach of duty to the
Justice or the Court.
Kozinski is correct when he states that former clerks have an advantage
in knowing what to look for in the publicly available papers of a former
Justice or what to ask in speaking to a former clerk. But this point does not
prove that such clerks act improperly when they rely upon such sources.
There is an enormous difference between revealing confidences and
reporting publicly available information. The Marshall papers are available
to anyone who visits the Library of Congress. Former law clerks should not
be prohibited from using such publicly available information in the same
manner as historians and reporters.
B. Did Edward Lazarus Act Illegally?
The most serious charge lodged against Lazarus is that he violated
federal law by using documents illegally removed from the Supreme Court.
This possibility was first raised by Richard Painter in an op-ed piece in the
Wall Street Journal.53 Painter wrote:
Portions of this book are based on written memoranda and e-mail
communications that have apparently been taken from the Supreme
Court building. It is possible that Justice Blackmun or another
justice authorized their removal .... If there was no such
authorization, however, there is an even more serious issue to
consider. Federal law makes it a crime to convert government
records to personal use without authorization (18 U.S.C. § 641) or
to remove records deposited with a federal court without
53. See Richard W. Painter, Editorial, A Law Clerk Betrays the Supreme Court, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 13, 1998, at A23.
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authorization (18 U.S.C. § 2071). On their face, these statutes
appear to prohibit anyone from removing confidential records from
the Supreme Court without permission and using those records in a
book sold to the public 4
Kozinski elaborates on this suggestion:
Even if Lazarus himself did not remove the documents from the
building, somebody must have done so in contravention of the
Supreme Court Code of Conduct, and possibly in violation of
federal criminal law. It is unethical for a former law clerk-
particularly one who is now a federal prosecutor-to profit from
items procured in such an illicit fashion. To take possession of the
purloined documents and seek fame and fortune from publishing
them is the moral equivalent of trafficking in stolen merchandise!5
These veiled accusations are based on nothing more than surmise. As
discussed above, Kozinski, throughout his review, attempts to place the
burden of proof on Lazarus. But in our society a person never has the duty
of proving that he or she did not commit a crime.
Lazarus could have gotten access to memoranda not in the Marshall
papers in many different ways without violating the law. Individuals with
strong recollections of the documents might have described them to
Lazarus, and similar descriptions from several individuals would have
provided the needed corroboration. Former clerks might have obtained
permission from their Justices to remove copies of memoranda that they
drafted or helped write. It is even possible that someone at the Court shared
documents with Lazarus.
The document that is particularly at issue is a memorandum concerning
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servicesi6 that Lazarus did not know about
during the time of his clerkship. As to this document, there can be no
charge that Lazarus revealed a confidence he received while at the Court.
Therefore, as to this document, Lazarus is truly like any other reporter. No
reporter who gained access to such a document through confidential
interviews would be accused of a crime." Nor should Lazarus. Unless
54. Id.
55. Kozinski, supra note 4, at 844-45.
56. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
57. Kozinski says that Lazarus cannot equate himself with a reporter because former co-
clerks would place more trust in him and think that they were just refreshing his recollections. See
Kozinski, supra note 4, at 841. But as to the Webster memorandum, Lazarus was very much in the
role of reporter because any clerk from chambers that had the memorandum knew that Lazarus
could not have a copy, as none was circulated to Justice Blackmun. More importantly, a reporter
is a person who communicates information to the public. Sources may trust reporters for many
different reasons. Why a particular source chose to trust Lazarus has nothing to do with his status
as a reporter.
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Painter and Kozinski have real evidence of a legal violation, they should be
ashamed of their insinuations.
C. Did Edward Lazarus Act Immorally?
Besides claiming that Lazarus breached the Supreme Court Code of
Conduct and perhaps federal statutes, Kozinski charges Lazarus with a
breach of trust. Kozinski writes: "Lazarus also violated the bond of loyalty
to his Justice, the other Justices, and his fellow clerks. During the Term of
Lazarus's clerkship, everyone at the Court (except Lazarus) acted on the
common understanding that what happened within the Court's nonpublic
areas would not be made public." 8
Kozinski does not say what creates or defines this duty of loyalty. He
alludes to it as being an unspoken agreement, shared by all who work at the
Court. 9 Yet, my experience hardly comports with Kozinski's assertion. I
have heard countless former clerks tell stories-flattering and
unflattering-about their Justices, their co-clerks, their cases, and their
experiences. Indeed, it has been publicly reported that Kozinski speaks with
his former clerks who are working at the Court about their activities.6' The
sole support for Kozinski's duty of loyalty seems to be an unwritten,
unspoken understanding that does not exist.
More significantly, what is the trust that Lazarus violated? If the breach
of trust lies in simply disclosing confidential information about cases, then
this charge collapses into the accusation of unethical conduct discussed
above and again is answered by Lazarus's reliance on external sources.
The real basis for the claim of breach of trust, however, seems to be
that Lazarus portrayed some of the Justices and clerks in an unfavorable
manner. Kozinski makes it clear from the outset of his review that this is
what troubles him the most. In the initial footnote, Kozinski writes:
I clerked for Justice (then Judge) Kennedy, who is ill-treated in the
book, and one of Justice Kennedy's clerks, who is portrayed as a
cross between Don Corleone and Freddie Krueger, clerked for me
prior to his tenure at the Supreme Court. I also clerked for Chief
Justice Burger, who is briefly though brutally savaged, and I know
and respect Chief Justice Rehnquist, several of the Associate
58. Il at 846.
59. See id.; see also id. at 875 (speaking of a "common understanding" among clerks and
Justices at the Court).
60. See Rex Bossert, Clerks Route to Top Court: Their Choice of Circuit and Judge Shapes
Chance To Serve Supremes, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 20, 1997, at Al ("Judge Kozinski, who keeps in
touch with his former clerks, says having them go to the Supreme Court gives him added
intelligence about what the Justices are 'interested in'; that is, 'hot issues' and 'what may be right
for certiorari petitions."').
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Justices, and a number of their former clerks who are mentioned
unfavorably.61
In fact, Kozinski later makes explicit his claim that the duty of loyalty
is largely a duty not to embarrass the Court. He declares:
The terms of this understanding were not written down and its
contours were not crystal clear.... Thus, clerks generally felt free
to tell endearing or inspiring stories ... in a tribute to their bosses
or other Justices. But it was clearly understood that, under normal
circumstances, whatever one learned inside the Court-whether or
not it was covered by the duty of confidentiality-would not be
repeated on the outside, especially if it tended to demean the Court,
the Justices, or fellow clerks.62
In other words, Kozinski asserts that the duty of loyalty requires that
former clerks only praise, and never criticize or demean, any Justice, any
co-clerk, or the Court. Indeed, why should this duty be limited to just
matters concerning that Term of the Court? Kozinski's position is that law
clerks are brought into the family of the Court and it is wrong for family
members to air dirty laundry in public, even when they have moved away
from home.
Here, I find Kozinski's claimed duty of loyalty objectionable. I know of
no job for which it is a condition of employment that the employee, after
completing his tenure, can say only nice things about the former boss or the
institution. I would not dream of expecting that my former research
assistants, who at times handled confidential information, feel obligated to
speak only kindly of me or of the University that employed them. Kozinski
relies on shared experience to support his claimed duty of loyalty, but is it
not our shared experience that we may describe our bosses and our co-
workers in whatever terms we want, including unfavorable ones?
Kozinski's argument might be that it is permissible for a former clerk to
criticize other Justices or former clerks, but not to "demean" them. Even
assuming that the line between criticizing and demeaning could be drawn
meaningfully, this argument presumes that the entire Court should be
considered the clerk's "family" and that there is a duty of loyalty not to
demean family members.63 This may be Kozinski's sense of what loyalty
means, but the problem is that he asserts it as a universal truth applicable to
the entire Court and then criticizes Lazarus for not meeting it. Kozinski
never explains why Lazarus should feel a duty of loyalty to clerks in other
61. Kozinski, supra note 4, at 835 n.t. The description of the former law clerk as a cross
between Don Corleone and Freddie Krueger is Kozinski's, not Lazarus's.
62. l. at 846.
63. Id. at 875 (referring to a clerkship as "membership in a family").
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chambers or why he should regard them as "family members," especially
clerks whom he constantly battled and distrusted. The metaphor of a family
is powerful, but inapt to a work environment such as the one Lazarus
describes in his book.
I am particularly troubled by the notion that a duty of loyalty, such as
the one Kozinski asserts, applies to an important public institution such as
the Supreme Court. As I discuss in more detail below, people should know
about the Court and how it decides cases. If a Justice's decisions are a result
of improper influences, people should know. More generally, people should
know how the attitudes and views of the Justices affect their decisions. For
example, in studying the Supreme Court's race decisions of the 1940s and
1950s, I found it telling that Supreme Court Justice Stanley Reed was so
racist that he would not attend the Court's Christmas party if African-
American employees were present.64
In sum, if the claim of a breach of trust is based on disclosure of
confidential information, that disclosure did not occur; if it is based on
Lazarus's saying unflattering things about the Court, there is no duty
imposed on former clerks only to praise the institution. Alex Kozinski, like
all of us, would prefer that his friends not be insulted or criticized in print.
But it is wrong to transfer that sentiment into a moral duty used to excoriate
the critic.
II. DOES EDWARD LAZARUS Do ANYTHING USEFUL?
As I read Closed Chambers, I was impressed by the wealth of new
information that it contained. Although I have been teaching constitutional
law for almost two decades and try to read a great deal of what is written
about the Supreme Court, I learned much from the book. Because the book
is written for a mass audience in a clear and engaging style, I would expect
that nonlawyers would learn an enormous amount from it about what the
Rehnquist Court has considered and decided in the last decade. As I state in
Part HII, I disagree with some of the conclusions Lazarus draws. Still, I must
recognize the tremendous amount of information contained within the book
and the excellent prose style of the author.
I was therefore surprised when Kozinski and others criticized the book
for providing little new information. Kozinski says that Lazarus "rehearses
arguments developed by others and tries to make his mark by spicing up the
story with insider gossip. Nor is it clear that Lazarus tells us anything
useful-as opposed to merely titillating-about the Court." 
65
64. See BERNARD SCHVARTZ, DECISION: How THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES CASES 66
(1996).
65. Kozinski, supra note 4, at 873 (citations omitted).
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It is possible that, although I try to read the Court's decisions and what
is written about the institution, I just know much less about it than other
reviewers and therefore had much more to learn from Closed Chambers. It
is also possible that those who dislike the book, for the reasons discussed
above, find it useful to dismiss the book's contributions. Although this
impulse is understandable, it is unfair. Even if one disagrees with Lazarus's
choice to write the book as he did, it should be possible to recognize its
contributions.
I believe that by carefully combing the Marshall papers, as few scholars
have had the time to do, and by interviewing the clerks from the Terms
considered, as none have done before, Lazarus has provided a wealth of
new information. I see two main benefits from the book: opening the
Supreme Court to greater public scrutiny and providing new information
about particular cases.
A. Knowledge Is Better than Ignorance
Kozinski proclaims that the Court's secrecy is a good thing. He writes:
Even assuming the truth of Lazarus's worst charges, he does not
explain what we are supposed to do with the 'information' he
provides-except to feel contempt for various Justices....
It is an article of faith among the post-baby boom generation
that more information is better than less, and that democracy abhors
the vacuum of a secret institution. Lazarus pushes these bromides
hard, but he does not pause to consider whether they hold true
when applied to the courts.66
Here, too, I disagree with Kozinski. The value of information need not be
purely utilitarian; it is not the case that Lazarus's book is of value only if it
leads to impeachment or causes definitive changes. Knowing more helps us
to understand and evaluate the Rehnquist Court, and it might, along with
other events and writings, cause changes within the Court itself. Moreover,
Lazarus's book provides the occasion for contemplating the degree of
secrecy that should surround the Court. Whatever conclusion one draws,
there is inherent value in the contemplation.
This is not to say that secrecy never has value; rather, it is to deny
Kozinski's claim that information about government has value only if it has
direct utilitarian value. Kozinski's position is far too limited a view of when
knowledge is beneficial. It is good for us to know how the institution
operates and how its officials are performing, in part, so that we can judge
our government and assess its performance. Even though federal judges
66. Id. at 873-74.
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have life tenure, we still should be informed about how they are performing
in office. If we conclude that they are inadequate in some regard, they can
be criticized, and ideally this might inspire improved performance. In the
extreme cases, disclosures might reveal impeachable offenses. Much more
commonly, information on failings can lead to pressure-even on
individuals with life tenure-for change.
Also, information about the Court is useful in understanding and
assessing its decisions. An enormous amount of scholarly attention is
devoted to explaining these decisions, and knowing how the Court came to
its conclusions can be very instructive in appreciating and evaluating them.
For example, Woodward and Armstrong's revelations in The Brethren67
about the writing of United States v. Nixon" are very helpful to
understanding the case. The Nixon opinion has a disjointed quality; the
parts do not quite seem to fit together, and they appear to have been written
by different Justices. In fact, Woodward and Armstrong tell of how Chief
Justice Burger assigned himself the majority opinion but replaced various
parts of his draft with sections drafted by other Justices.69 According to
Woodward and Armstrong, the Justices had a secret lunch meeting at which
they divided up the opinion, and several then wrote new sections that were
circulated, joined by the others, and ultimately incorporated by the Chief
Justice.70
Indeed, confidential information about a Justice's thought process
might be useful when a future Court reconsiders the issue. For instance, a
biography of Justice Lewis Powell by Professor John Jeffries revealed that
Justice Powell initially voted to strike down the Georgia sodomy statute in
Bowers v. Hardwick7' and then changed his mind.72 Jeffries reports that
Justice Powell told a clerk that he had never met a homosexual73 and that,
after leaving the Court, Justice Powell expressed regret and said that he
thought he had made a mistake in Bowers.74 Knowing this may make a
future Justice or Court more willing to overrule the decision.
At the very least, knowing about the Court's internal operation has
historical value. As historians assess a particular era of the Supreme Court
and the performance of individual Justices, detailed inside information-
such as comes from Justices' papers and clerk interviews-can be
invaluable.
67. BOB WOODWARD & ScoTr ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT
(1979).
68. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
69. See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 67, at 314-47.
70. See id. at 322-46.
71. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
72. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEwis F. POWELL, JR. 522-24 (1994).
73. See id. at 521.
74. See id. at 530.
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Lazarus's book contains much information that is useful in all of these
regards. First, overall, his description of the Court should inspire renewed
confidence in the institution. Although this is clearly not the conclusion
Lazarus draws from his revelations,75 the book portrays a group of hard-
working Justices doing exactly what a Supreme Court should do: deciding
issues based on their understanding of the law without political pressure or
influence. There is not a single instance in Lazarus's book where any
Justice is lobbied by interested individuals or entities. There is not a single
instance of decisions being improperly influenced in any way.
While Lazarus contends that the Court's clerks play too great a role in
its decisionmaking,76 his description of specific cases belies this criticism.
In case after case, Lazarus documents the Justices' personal involvement in
their decisionmaking through their attempts to persuade others, their
internal memoranda, and their draft opinions. I came away from Lazarus's
book with a sense that virtually all the Justices were fully engaged in their
tasks and working hard. The book is a portrait of nine human beings, with
strengths and weaknesses common to all human beings, struggling to
discharge the role assigned to them by the Constitution.
Moreover, Lazarus offers information that aids in understanding many
specific decisions. For example, in teaching Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services,77 I often have asked whether there is a difference between
the approach in Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion, which
advocates rational basis review for evaluating abortion regulations,78 and
Justice Scalia's call for expressly overruling Roe v. Wade.79 I have also
focused on Justice Scalia's angry, seemingly personal attack on Justice
O'Connor. Lazarus offers new information, based on interviews with clerks
and internal memoranda never before disclosed, to explain how the
conservatives tried to engineer the overruling of Roe and why Justice Scalia
was so angry at Justice O'Connor for thwarting this effort.80
Third, Lazarus provides a great deal of information that is useful in the
appraisal of particular Justices. For example, Lazarus describes how Justice
Thurgood Marshall, in his later years on the Court, was not up to the
workload and, in fact, once voted in error at conference."1 Lazarus also
describes how Justice Brennan's choice to assign the majority opinion to
himself in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union8 2 might well have been
75. See, e.g., LAzARUS, supra note 1, at 7.
76. See id. at 262-71.
77. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
78. See id. at 519-20.
79. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Webster, 492 U.S. at 532 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
80. See LAzARUS, supra note 1, at 407-08.
81. See id. at 446-47.
82. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
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responsible for the Court's ruling, which substantially narrowed the
protection from discrimination provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1981.83 In addition,
Lazarus depicts the tensions between Justices O'Connor and Brennan and
suggests how this might have influenced Justice O'Connor to write
separately in some important cases." All of this information is useful in
making an informed appraisal of the Justices, as historians and scholars will
and must do.
Finally, and more generally, the Lazarus book provides an excellent
vehicle for reconsidering the secrecy that surrounds the Supreme Court.
The debate generated by Lazarus's book, even more than the book itself,
should encourage careful thought about whether the intense secrecy
surrounding every aspect of the Court's work is a good thing. For example,
should the oral arguments of the Court be broadcast? Although a full
development of the argument is beyond the scope of this Review, after
reflection, I see little justification for not televising every Supreme Court
argument. There is no jury to be unduly influenced and lawyers are unlikely
to direct their arguments to the camera rather than the Court. There seems
little risk that the Court will ever lose control over the proceedings. Most
importantly, the Supreme Court is deciding crucial social issues and people
should have the chance to see and hear the arguments.
To go even further, should the Court's deliberations remain secret? The
Court's tradition, of course, is that only Justices attend the conference
where cases are deliberated and decided. The assumption is that openness
would chill candor and frank discussions. Yet, Lazarus documents that little
discussion actually occurs at conference,"5 and Kozinski defends this as
understandable and acceptable. 6 Therefore, it seems that little speech
would be chilled. Indeed, open deliberations likely would have the opposite
effect: They would encourage more discussion among the Justices. If the
Justices knew that their deliberative sessions were being observed, they
probably would want to show that they were engaged and meeting the
expectation of having serious debate over important legal and social
questions.'
I am not making the claim that the Court and its processes should not
be surrounded by any secrecy. But I think that the secrecy that has evolved
is worth reconsidering and is likely much broader than it needs to be.
83. See LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 309-14.
84. See id. at 277-78.
85. See id. at 285.
86. See Kozinski, supra note 4, at 865.
87. For the last 20 months, I have served on an elected commission in Los Angeles to rewrite
the City Charter. By state law, every meeting-except for a few that dealt with personnel issues-
has been open to the public and televised. I know that there are many occasions in which some or
all of the Commissioners would have liked to deliberate behind closed doors, but I think that our
discussions have been more thorough and more candid because of the openness.
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Lazarus's book is an excellent occasion for thinking about the degree of
openness that should surround our nation's highest court.
B. Useful Information About Many Specific Cases
As mentioned earlier, I learned a significant amount of new information
about particular cases from reading Lazarus's book. Perhaps the easiest way
to demonstrate this, and to refute Kozinski's contention that there is nothing
useful in the book, is to give examples. I do not claim that none of this
information has ever appeared elsewhere; a tremendous amount of research
would be necessary to determine that. Suffice it to say that these are things
that I, an avid Court watcher who has taught and written about
constitutional law for almost two decades, learned from the book. I am
certain that many, if not all, of these revelations are new.
1. The Story of Tompkins v. Texas"s
Tompkins was a death penalty case in which certiorari was granted,
briefing was done, oral arguments were held, but no opinion was ever
written or published. Instead, the Court issued only the statement: "The
judgment below is affirmed by an equally divided Court. Justice O'Connor
took no part in the consideration or decision of this case." 89
Lazarus devotes a chapter to recounting the Tompkins case in careful
detail. He persuasively demonstrates that there were serious errors
committed in the trial court, including the prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges in violation of Batson v. Kentucky90 and the judge's failure to
instruct the jury as to alternative conviction options in violation of Beck v.
Alabama." Lazarus shows the inadequacy of the Texas courts' handling of
these issues. According to him, the initial vote on the Court was for
reversal, but Justice Kennedy changed his mind and joined with the
conservative bloc of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and
Scalia.92 Because Justice O'Connor did not participate, apparently because
her husband had recently been a partner in the law firm that was handling
the case pro bono, the Court split 4-4.
The 4-4 split was also the result of another interesting switch. Justice
Stevens initially had drafted an opinion affirming on the Beck issue and
reversing on the Batson question. Justice Kennedy's switching sides would
have made the Court's decision 5-3 to affirm on Beck and 4-4 on Batson.
88. 490 U.S. 754 (1989).
89. Id.
90. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
91. 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
92. See LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 61-69.
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Rather than cast the deciding vote to affirm, Justice Stevens switched sides
to make the Beck issue 4-4 and thus to scuttle his own majority opinion.
Lazarus quotes Justice Stevens's memorandum indicating his change and
his conclusion: "'In all events, I am now persuaded that the best disposition
of the entire case.. . is a simple affirmance by an evenly divided Court."' 93
Lazarus concludes:
In the 200-year history of the Court, I very much doubt that the
author of an opinion has changed his vote even a handful of times
to assure that the Court does not issue his own opinion.... Yet
Stevens scuttled his opinion, even while agreeing with the legal
principle it expounded, rather than put his imprimatur (as well as
the Court's) on Tompkin's sentence of death.94
The Tompkins case illustrates how the desire of several members of the
Court to pave the way for executions caused them to overlook very serious
errors of law. As I have argued elsewhere, it even causes them, at times, to
misstate and misapply the law.95
2. The Account of Justice Douglas's Actions in the Rosenberg Case
The executions of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were important political
and legal events in the McCarthy-era hysteria of the early 1950s. The
couple was convicted and sentenced to death for their alleged involvement
with a Communist spy ring organized to funnel atomic secrets to the Soviet
Union.
I have read a great deal about the case, but I never knew, until reading
Closed Chambers, of Justice Douglas's erratic behavior in its handling.
Lazarus recounts how the Court denied direct review of the Rosenbergs'
conviction by a 6-3 vote, with Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Burton
favoring review. Subsequently, the Court also denied review of the
Rosenbergs' first habeas petition, and after Justice Frankfurter decided not
to write a dissent, Justice Douglas "abruptly reversed himself' and decided
to write an angry dissent to the denial of certiorari and condemn the
government for "reprehensible" prosecutorial actions.96 Justice Jackson
was angry at this and thought that Justice Douglas was grandstanding.
Lazarus quotes a memorandum from Justice Frankfurter, found in the
93. Id at 69 (quoting Memorandum from John Paul Stevens, Associate Justice, Supreme
Court of the United States, to William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United
States).
94. Id.
95. See Evan Caminker & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Lawless Execution of Robert Alton
Harris, 102 YALE L.J. 225 (1992).
96. LAzARUS, supra note 1, at 136.
1110 [Vol. 108: 1087
Opening Closed Chambers
Jackson papers, in which Justice Frankfurter recounts how Justice Jackson
described Justice Douglas's actions as "the dirtiest, most shameful, most
cynical performance that I have ever heard on matters pertaining to law." 97
Justice Jackson decided to call Justice Douglas's bluff and cast a fourth
vote for granting certiorari, "rather than have the Court deny cert. with one
Justice (Douglas) publicly casting doubt on the Rosenbergs' convictions.""9
As the Court discussed the schedule for hearing the appeal, Justice Douglas
backed down and withdrew his proposed dissent from the denial of
certiorari.
Five days before the scheduled executions, the Court refused even to
hear oral arguments as to whether a stay should be granted. The Court's
vote was 5-4 against the petition, with Justice Douglas providing the crucial
fifth vote. After denying relief on yet another habeas petition, the Court
concluded its Term and the Justices "pledged that this would be their last
decision respecting the Rosenbergs. No Justice would act on his own to
reopen the matter, and the Rosenbergs' execution would go forward." 99
A day later, two new attorneys presented a new legal theory to Justice
Douglas-that the Rosenbergs had been prosecuted under the wrong
statute-and Justice Douglas granted a stay of execution. The Court held
oral arguments on this issue a day later and within twenty-four hours
announced their 6-3 decision to overturn Justice Douglas's stay of the
Rosenbergs' execution. Nine hours later the Rosenbergs were executed.
Lazarus presents this story based on information gained from published
sources, Justices' papers, and oral histories. From an historical perspective,
it is important in understanding the Rosenberg case and in assessing Justice
Douglas. It is also revealing history about the Court's behavior in high-
profile death penalty cases.
3. The Detailed Presentation of the Facts and Legal Issues in the
McCleskey Case
Lazarus devotes two full chapters and part of another (over sixty pages)
to the Supreme Court's handling of Warren McCleskey's case. This
litigation produced two landmark Supreme Court rulings. In McCleskey v.
Kemp, the Supreme Court ruled, 5-4, that statistics proving racial disparity
in the imposition of the death penalty were not sufficient to demonstrate an
equal protection violation.'0° In McCleskey v. Zant, the Court held, 6-3, that
97. Id at 137.
98. Id
99. Id. at 138.
100. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). For a discussion of the case, see Erwin Chernerinsky, Eliminating
Discrimination in Administering the Death Penalty: The Need for the Racial Justice Act, 35
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 519 (1995)
1999] 1111
The Yale Law Journal
individuals may present only one habeas corpus petition and that successive
petitions are permissible only if (a) there is proof of good cause and
prejudice would result from not being heard; or (b) there is a showing that
actual innocence is likely.01
Lazarus provides a more detailed account of the factual background of
the case than I have seen anywhere else, and he also gives us an insightful
account of the Court's internal discussions concerning it. Most striking is a
memorandum Lazarus found in the Marshall papers that Justice Scalia
wrote to the other Justices.0 z While Justice Powell's majority opinion
points to the inadequacy of the proof of discrimination, Justice Scalia
wrote: "'Since it is my view.., that the unconscious operation of irrational
sympathies and antipathies, including racial, upon jury decisions and
(hence) prosecutorial decisions is real, acknowledged in the decisions of
this court, and ineradicable, I cannot honestly say that all I need is more
proof." 1 03 In other words, Justice Scalia says that he was convinced that
the death penalty is administered in a racially discriminatory fashion, but he
still voted to affirm McCleskey's death sentence. Even more troubling,
Justice Scalia says that additional persuasive proof of systemic
discrimination would make no difference for him.
Lazarus marshals the evidence to show that there was substantial doubt
as to McCleskey's guilt and that serious legal errors were subsequently
discovered in the handling of the case. When these were presented to the
Court, it announced a new rule that habeas petitioners were barred from
subsequent petitions, except in extraordinary circumstances, and denied
McCleskey relief. He was then executed by the State of Georgia.
Lazarus devotes over ten percent of his book to the McCleskey saga.
Although I have taught the McCleskey decisions countless times in my
Constitutional Law and Federal Courts classes and have also written about
them, I learned a great deal of new information from Lazarus's account.
This information, presented clearly and forcefully, suggests that McCleskey
may have been innocent of the crime for which he was executed and that
his execution was founded on serious violations of the law by police and
prosecutors.
101. 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
102. Lazarus is not the first to find this memorandum. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 99,
at 528; Dennis D. Dorin, Far Right of the Mainstream: Racism, Rights, and Remedies of Justice
Antonin Scalia's McCleskey Memorandum, 45 MERCER L. REv. 1035 (1994).
103. LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 211.
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4. The Court's Handling of Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services"°4
Webster was an important abortion case decided in 1989, in which
Justice Scalia expressly urged the overruling of Roe v. Wade and three other
Justices implicitly called for its overruling by advocating rational basis
review for the evaluation of government abortion regulations.
Lazarus provides much new information about the Court's internal
handling of the case. For example, Lazarus describes the Justices'
discussion at conference and recounts that Chief Justice Rehnquist, who
had dissented in Roe, recanted that position and "stated that he now thought
Roe v. Wade had reached the right result given the specific facts of that
case. Texas had banned all abortions except in the narrow circumstance
where the life of the mother was at stake. In Chief Justice Rehnquist's
revised view, that was too restrictive." 05 According to Lazarus, the vote at
conference was 5-4 to uphold all aspects of the Missouri law that was being
challenged, and the disagreements among the five in the majority over how
to handle Roe were to be" 'worked out in the writing." 1
06
Lazarus reveals a secret memorandum that Chief Justice Rehnquist
circulated exclusively to his conservative colleagues, Justices White,
O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. In it, the Chief Justice urges them to stick
together: "'Because of the "media hype" that this case has received.., and
because we are cutting back on previous doctrine in this area, I think it
more than usually desirable to have an opinion of the Court if we possibly
can."" 107 Lazarus describes the draft opinion Chief Justice Rehnquist
circulated to these Justices and how it would have instituted rational basis
as the standard for judicial scrutiny of abortion regulations and at the same
time proclaimed that the government has a compelling interest in protecting
fetal life from the moment of conception. Although the Chief Justice
disavowed overruling Roe, that result would obviously have followed from
such an opinion.
Lazarus then describes how Justice O'Connor refused to join Chief
Justice Rehnquist's opinion, favoring a narrower approach that would leave
the future of Roe for later cases to decide. Lazarus also recounts the
reactions from other Justices, including Justice Kennedy's request for a
relatively minor change and Justice Scalia's "barbed" reply to Justice
O'Connor.' After describing in detail the Court's internal debate and the
various drafts and memoranda circulated, Lazarus reveals-and this, too, I
104. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
105. LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 399.
106. l at 400 (quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist).
107. 1& at 402 (quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist's cover letter for his first Webster draft).
108. I& at 408.
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have never seen before-that Justice Stevens drafted a strongly worded
response to Justice Scalia's harsh attack on Justice O'Connor, though he
later omitted this rebuke from his dissent.1 9
Although the Court's subsequent decision in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey has lessened Webster's significance, I still teach Webster to my
students. From now on, I will use Lazarus's account to describe how the
opinions emerged from the Court. At the very least, his account offers a
fascinating glimpse of how the Court handles controversial cases.
5. The Story Behind the Discussion of the Methodology of Judicial
Review in Michael H. v. Gerald D. 0
Michael H. v. Gerald D. is an important case that substantially
narrowed the rights of unmarried fathers. The Court held that a state may
create an irrebuttable presumption that a married woman's husband is the
father of her child and use this presumption to deny all parental rights,
including visitation, to an unmarried father. Michael H. is much discussed
for Justice Scalia's articulation of the view that in protecting rights under
the Due Process Clause, the Court should consider the relevant tradition at
the most specific level. For example, Professors Tribe and Doff wrote a
book largely devoted to responding to this view."'
Lazarus describes how Justice Scalia initially circulated a draft opinion
that did not include the discussion of the appropriate method of judicial
analysis. Several months later and two weeks before the oral argument in
Webster, however, Justice Scalia circulated a new draft that argued that
"the Court should always conduct its inquiry into tradition in the narrowest
possible manner.''" Lazarus explains how a law clerk in Justice
O'Connor's chambers spotted this addition and how both her conservative
and liberal clerks tried to persuade her about whether to join that part of
Justice Scalia's opinion. Ultimately, Justice O'Connor did not join, and that
part of Justice Scalia's opinion did not gain majority support. But as
Lazarus points out, it is likely that Justice Scalia wrote this passage to
influence the handling of Webster, and its support by a majority would have
had potentially important implications for all future cases involving
substantive due process claims.
I have selected five examples of interesting and important information
that I learned from Lazarus's book. I could have given many, many more.
109. See id. at 417.
110. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
111. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION
(1991); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: The Vanishing
Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REv. 43, 55-56 (1989) (discussing Justice Scalia's tradition analysis
in Michael H.).
112. LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 389.
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The abundance of such examples demonstrates, I think, the book's
significant contributions to understanding the Court and its rulings.
I. DOES EDWARD LAZARUS JUSTIFY HIs NORMATIVE CONCLUSIONS?
Although I do not agree with Judge Kozinski's criticisms of Closed
Chambers, I have serious reservations of my own about the book. My
concern is not over the descriptive aspects of the effort, but rather over
Lazarus's normative criticisms of the Court. Lazarus is not content merely
to describe the decisions and how they came about; his book is filled with
his own opinions and judgments. His central thesis is that the Court is
deeply divided ideologically and that this is undesirable. He proclaims that
the Court is violating the "rule of law" and ignoring what he regards as the
crucial distinction between law and politics.
It is this aspect of the book that I wish to criticize. First, Lazarus's book
is premised on a normative vision that he does not detail or defend. His
judgments are presented as conclusions, and nowhere does he explain what
he means by the "rule of law," why his should be the proper definition, or
what separation between law and politics should exist. Second, I strongly
disagree with Lazarus's normative premises. Ideological division on the
Court is inevitable in handling socially divisive issues like abortion,
affirmative action, and the death penalty, and it is not inherently
undesirable. I believe that Lazarus relies on a false distinction between law
and politics, and indeed, his book fosters a destructive image of
constitutional law. Moreover, he fails to show that the Court's ideological
divisions have caused it to act improperly.
A. Lazarus's Failure To Defend His Normative Vision
Throughout the book, Lazarus offers normative criticisms of the Court
and its approach to constitutional law. In his introduction, he describes the
current Court as a "nightmare" and writes that:
[T]he severity of these divisions [within the Court] has corroded the
Court's institutional culture and driven the Justices to disregard the
principles of decisionmaking-deliberation, integrity of argument,
self-restraint-that separate the judicial function from the exercise
of purely political power. [This book] is about a Court whose inner
workings are dangerously at odds with the source of its authority
within our constitutional scheme." 3
113. Id. at7.
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This distinction between law and politics recurs throughout the text. In
criticizing the Senate's rejection of Robert Bork's nomination, Lazarus says
that the political battle "ate away the thin but crucial divide between law
and politics ... ." 114 In describing the Court's decisionmaking in Patterson
v. McLean Credit Co., Lazarus concludes that "Patterson exposed and
advanced a corruption in the process by which the Justices defined the
law." "5 In condemning the Court's opinion in Roe v. Wade, Lazarus writes
of "the incalculable damage that Roe inflicted on the idea that there is such
a thing as constitutional law ruled by neither the hands of long-dead
Framers nor the personal biases of sitting Justices." 116 Lazarus says that
"the Webster saga dramatized the expanding and inappropriate
politicization of the Court and the judicial process." '17 In his conclusion,
Lazarus writes of "corruption in the judicial process." 1 8 He says that "[i]n
Webster, what passed for judging was mostly pretense."119 There, he adds,
"the reach of politics into the province of the Court had jumped these
natural bounds. In our many political factions outside the Court, we have
come to see and to treat the Court as but yet another purely political,
indeed, quasi-legislative institution for forwarding our respective
agendas." 1
20
Lazarus not only says that the Court has failed to adhere to the line that
he sees between law and politics, but that this failure will have dire
consequences for the Court's institutional integrity and legitimacy. He
writes: "In light of such pervasive and continuing internal division, the
question for the Court, as for the rest of government, has been whether the
institution's own integrity can withstand the corrupting force of bitter
disagreement. And the answer, thus far, is dismal."' He speaks of the
Court as being in "crisis." 122
Other normative judgments are scattered throughout his book. He often
shifts abruptly from being purely descriptive to openly normative. After
describing the Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, he declares that "the
political views of the liberal Justices outstripped the logic of legitimate
legal argument" and that the Justices "betrayed the very rule of law they
claimed to be upholding." " Similarly, he says that Patterson showed a
"growing disregard for the interests of the Court as an institution and for
114. Id. at 248.




119. Id. at 422.
120. Ia& at421.
121. Id. at 8.
122. Id. at516.
123. Id. at 109.
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the duties of that institution in American public life.... By the time of
Patterson, the Justices had all but forsaken this obligation to their own
community and to the nation at large."124 He says that Roe and Furman
"shared the flaw of exercising the greatest measure of judicial power on the
least defensible justification." " He speaks of the battles against Bork's and
Thomas's nominations for the Supreme Court as a "corruption of the
appointment process." 6
On and on, his book offers judgments about the Court, its proper role,
and the desirability of its decisions. I certainly do not question the propriety
of Lazarus, or anyone else, making such judgments, but I do criticize his
failure to do more than assert them in passing. The very thesis of his book is
that the Court has ignored the rule of law and overstepped the proper line
separating law and politics. Yet, he never defends the normative vision that
underlies this criticism. The "rule of law" is a phrase with great power, and
condemning the Court for violating it is a serious matter. But what,
precisely, does Lazarus mean by this phrase, and why should readers accept
his as the proper definition?
Lazarus continually invokes a distinction between law and politics, but
he never spells out this difference or explains why we should agree with
this vision. This is not incidental to his book; it is the basis for the
judgments he proclaims throughout its chapters. As one who believes that
Roe was correctly decided and that the fights against the Bork and Thomas
nominations were proper and essential, 7 I find Lazarus's passing
normative judgments to be irritating. I would not mind if he presented an
argument with which I could disagree, but he gives little more than his
opinion as a pronouncement that all should regard as self-evident.
Lazarus, of course, is not writing for an audience of constitutional law
professors. But this fact increases, not decreases, his burden of justification.
In particular, readers unfamiliar with the jurisprudential scholarship that
struggles to define the rule of law, or the critical legal studies attacks on
distinctions between law and politics, should realize that his
pronouncements rest on premises that are disputable. Lazarus has a
normative vision of the proper role of the Court and how it should decide
cases. But he never details or defends it.
124. Id. at 324.
125. Id. at 369.
126. Il at 456.
127. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution Is Not "Hard Law": The Bork Rejection and
the Future of Constitutional Jurisprudence, 6 CONST. COMMENTARY 29 (1989); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Rationalizing the Abortion Debate: Legal Rhetoric and the Abortion Controversy,
31 BuFF. L. REv. 107 (1982).
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B. Why I Disagree with Lazarus's Vision
Perhaps if I agreed with Lazarus's normative premises, I would not see
the need for him to defend them. However, I do not share his vision about
the Court and its appropriate decisionmaking process. In four crucial
regards, I disagree with Lazarus.
First, I do not agree that ideological splits on the Court are to be decried
or that they are harmful. A central aspect of Lazarus's book is its complaint
about the deep ideological divisions in the Rehnquist Court. At the very
least, his conclusion is greater than his evidence supports. He draws his
conclusions from an examination of three of the most controversial areas of
contemporary constitutional law-abortion, affirmative action, and the
death penalty.12 Moreover, he focuses primarily upon the earlier years of
the Rehnquist Court. In contrast, a review of the last Supreme Court Term
reveals little evidence of significant ideological divisions. Perhaps that is
because there were no cases concerning abortion or affirmative action and
no major death penalty decisions.
Last Term, there were some 5-4 decisions where the majority
comprised Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas.129 But there also were 5-4 decisions where it
comprised Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. 3
There even was one major case decided by a 5-4 margin where the majority
was Justices Thomas, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer."3' Most of the
more significant cases of the Term were decided by lopsided margins,
including the major First Amendment case, which had an 8-1 split, 32 and
two significant cases concerning sexual harassment that were decided 7-
2.133
128. Kozinski also notes that Lazarus focuses only on these three particularly controversial
areas. See Kozinskd, supra note 4, at 857.
129. See, e.g., Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998) (holding that
schools are not liable on a respondeat superior basis for sexual harassment by their teachers);
Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 118 S. Ct. 1925 (1998) (holding that funds in state IOLTA
programs are private property).
130. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998) (holding that HIV-positive status is
a disability within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act); Crawford-El v. Britton,
118 S. Ct. 1584 (1998) (holding that qualified immunity does not require proof by clear and
convincing evidence of an official's unconstitutional intent to retaliate against a plaintiff's
protected speech).
131. See United States v. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. 2028 (1998) (holding that punitive forfeiture
violates the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportionate to the
defendant's offense).
132. See NEA v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998) (holding that the requirement that the
National Endowment of the Arts consider whether artistic work shows "decency and respect for
the diverse values of the American public" when awarding grants is not unconstitutionally vague
and does not violate the First Amendment rights of grant applicants).
133. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998) (allowing vicarious liability
for discrimination, but permitting an affirmation defense based on the employer's efforts to
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More importantly, ideological division seems inevitable on a Court that
must deal with controversial issues. A Court with Justices such as Brennan,
Marshall, Rehnquist, and Scalia will be deeply split on the same legal
questions that divide the nation. There is as much point in complaining
about that as in bemoaning the time the sun rises or sets. Not surprisingly, a
deep ideological division might be accompanied by a measure of distrust
and even, at times, a lack of respect.
Such divisions have existed on the Court throughout American history.
Indeed, they might be seen as an intentional feature of the American system
for choosing federal judges. The Supreme Court almost always is composed
of Justices selected by many different Presidents over a relatively long
period of time instead of nine Justices selected in each new President's
ideological image. This is what produced a Court with a Thurgood
Marshall, appointed by President Lyndon Johnson, and an Antonin Scalia,
appointed by President Ronald Reagan. Justices Marshall and Scalia shared
little in their life experiences, world views, or conceptions of constitutional
law. An ideological divide was inevitable.
Second, Lazarus does not make a persuasive case that the Court's
ideological division is harming it. He shows no ethical violations by any of
the Justices. Although he describes great hostilities among the clerks,
including a Term-ending fistfight,3 there is much less indication that this
affected the Justices' relationships.
Many of the transgressions of which Lazarus complains-such as Chief
Justice Rehnquist's circulation of a draft in Webster to his conservative
colleagues, but not the whole Court-seem minor. And while Lazarus
criticizes particular cases as presenting arguments that he regards as
specious or hypocritical,135 one could lodge this complaint against countless
decisions, from Marbury v. Madison136 on; this does not prove the
systematic deficiencies of the Rehnquist Court. Likewise, he is correct that
the Rehnquist Court is inconsistent in how much weight it gives
precedent;137 but this undoubtedly has been true of the Court in all eras.
When Lazarus objects to decisions such as Furman v. Georgia13 as lacking
"the logic of legitimate legal argument," 139 he is advancing a particular
ameliorate the harassing conduct); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998) (allowing
vicarious liability for sexual harassment by supervisors).
134. See LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 419.
135. See, e.g., id. at 205-09 (criticizing McCleskey); id. at 364-69 (criticizing Roe).
136. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
137. Compare Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion) (using
stare decisis to justify affirming Roe v. Wade), with Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)
(overruling an earlier decision concerning the Eleventh Amendment), and Adarand Constructors
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (overruling an earlier decision concerning affirmative action).
138. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
139. LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 109.
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view of what counts as appropriate legal argument, without ever defending
this view.
Lazarus criticizes the Court for its occasional splintering and its
willingness to produce decisions without a majority opinion, but he also
criticizes the Court when Justices attempt to produce majority opinions by,
for example, changing positions or circulating drafts to only some
chambers. How much a Justice should compromise his or her views to
produce a majority opinion is a fascinating question, but Lazarus does not
address it. The propriety of internal lobbying also raises interesting issues,
but Lazarus never develops or defends his standards with respect to that
matter either.
Third, I strongly disagree with his repeated claim that the Court ignored
or breached the wall that separates law and politics. As I have explained
herein, after reading the book, I am left unsure about how the Court's
actions are improper. Lazarus's claim is based on a particular conception
about the relative proper roles of the Court (law) as compared to the
legislature (politics). It is a charge that the Court is making value choices of
the sort that more properly belong in the legislative process.
The Court, however, must make value choices in deciding
constitutional cases. The difference between the Supreme Court and a
legislature is not that only the latter makes value decisions. The difference
is in how each body arrives at and justifies its conclusions.
The political process allows for direct lobbying and attempts to
influence votes based on interest-group pressure. Vote trading is an
accepted part of legislation. The legislature is never required to produce a
written justification for its choices. In contrast, the judicial process eschews
lobbying and insists that all arguments be presented in the highly
formalized structure of briefs and oral arguments. The Supreme Court must
explain all of its rulings in written opinions. In this sense, I believe that
there is a difference between "law" -the Supreme Court's processes-and
"politics" -the legislature's processes. Lazarus, however, finds no judicial
improprieties whatsoever in this regard; there is not a single instance in his
book of improper political influence within the Court.
Phrased slightly differently, the distinction between the Court and the
legislatures lies in the procedures each follows, not in the substantive value
choices each must make. Inescapably, constitutional law requires normative
analysis about which values should be protected from majoritarian
decisionmaking. Because the Constitution states values at an extremely
high level of abstraction, and because there are no definitive sources for
determining specific meanings, the Court must make value choices. These
will always reflect the identity and ideology of the Justices. Justices
Brennan and Scalia disagree not because one has a better understanding of
constitutional law or an inherently better method of interpretation, but
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because their values are so divergent. Ultimately, I believe that society is
made better by having an institution like the Court, largely insulated from
majoritarian pressures and political accountability, deciding which values
are so important that they cannot be left to the political process.
Thus, attempting to separate law and politics, except in the procedural
sense, is misguided. It is also destructive. The quest for value-neutral
judging is disingenuous. During the Term that Lazarus clerked, the Court
frequently proclaimed the need to avoid making value choices. For
example, the Court concluded that to reject the Kentucky legislature's
choice to allow capital punishment for sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds
would be to follow "the preferences of a majority of this Court" improperly
and "to replace judges of the law with a committee of philosopher-
kings."''" In Michael H. v. Gerald D., Justice Scalia, writing for the
plurality, said that recognizing the rights of unmarried fathers would make
"'the only limits to ... judicial intervention become the predilections of
those who happen at the time to be members of [the] Court."".4
But in allowing teenagers to be executed and in denying the right of the
biological father to visit his child, the Court made value judgments, no
matter how much it pretended otherwise. It is hardly surprising that the
cases were decided 5-4, with the five more conservative Justices in the
majority and the four more liberal Justices dissenting. The Court is thus
disingenuous when it declares that it is not making value choices. The more
commentators invoke the distinction between law and politics, as Lazarus
does, the more the Court is encouraged to hide these normative choices
behind a misleading rhetoric of value neutrality.
Moreover, I fear that Lazarus's use of "the rule of law" and his law-
politics distinction fuels public misunderstanding about the Court and its
role. It supports the simplistic notion that constitutional law is just there to
be found and that value choices by the Court constitute undue judicial
activism. The reality is that no matter what the Court does with regard to
abortion, affirmative action, and the death penalty, it must necessarily make
value choices, as is proper. Lazarus, however, never acknowledges this and
therefore lends support to misguided attacks on the judiciary.
.Finally, I disagree with Lazarus's view that the Supreme Court is a
fragile institution whose legitimacy can easily be lost. There is no evidence
for Lazarus's claim that the Court is an institution in danger of losing its
credibility and compromising its role in American government. Despite all
the events of the last decade, public respect for the Supreme Court remains
high.142
140. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,379 (1989).
141. 491 U.S. 110, 121 (1989) (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977)).
142. See, e.g., John M. Scheb ]I & William Lyons, Public Holds U.S. Supreme Court in High
Regard, 77 JUDICATURE 273 (1994) (describing high public esteem for the Supreme Court).
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The institutional credibility of the Supreme Court, as with any
institution, is a product of many factors and is not easily changed. As John
Hart Ely explains:
"[T]he possibility of judicial emasculation by way of popular
reaction against constitutional review by the courts has not in fact
materialized in more than a century and a half of American
experience." The warnings probably reached their peak during the
Warren years; they were not notably heeded; yet nothing
resembling destruction materialized. In fact, the Court's power
continued to grow, and probably never has been greater than it has
been over the past two decades.1 43
There is just no reason to believe that anything Lazarus describes will
significantly harm the Court's long-term institutional credibility.
IV. CONCLUSION
Like Lazarus, I am very critical of the Rehnquist Court. My criticisms,
however, are for the substantive choices it has made in so many areas of
constitutional law. The Court has dramatically narrowed the scope of some
constitutional rights, such as the Free Exercise Clause;1  it has created
seemingly insurmountable obstacles to achieving racial equality by
crippling affirmative action; and it has greatly lessened protections for
criminal defendants, especially in death penalty cases.'"
Lazarus, however, focuses not on the substantive problems with the
Rehnquist Court, but on its internal procedures. Here he misses the mark.
The internal machinations he describes seem relatively minor. The Court
unfailingly operates without improper political influences and without
ethical violations. Its closed chambers should be opened for public scrutiny,
but what most needs exposure is the Rehnquist Court's practice of hiding its
conservative value choices under the cloak of judicial neutrality. Criticizing
the Rehnquist Court requires unmasking its value choices and explaining
why these choices are wrong. I only wish that Edward Lazarus had done
much more of this.
143. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 47-48 (1980) (quoting EUGENE
ROSTOW, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE 165 (1962)) (citations omitted).
144. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
145. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (establishing strict
scrutiny as the standard for evaluating legal challenges to affirmative action programs); J.A.
Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
146. The post-McCleskey decisions, described by Lazarus in detail, are illustrative in this
regard. See LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 166-217.
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